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Abstract 
Much research indicates that ethnic diversity leads to suboptimal public goods provision and hinders 
economic development. However, similar levels of ethnic diversity are often associated with very 
different outcomes. This paper specifies under what conditions ethnic differences undermine tax 
compliance in multiethnic societies. Based on multilevel modeling of survey data from 70 countries, the 
paper shows that people belonging to small ethnic minorities in countries with a high level of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization are also those the most willing to accept tax evasion. However, 
generalized trust and trust in the government moderate the relationship between ethnic fractionalization 
and tax morale among small ethnic groups. The analysis suggests that ethnic diversity is not a poverty 
trap because its effect can be largely offset by measures increasing interpersonal trust across ethnic lines 
and trust in political institutions. The paper uses a new dataset that identifies World Values Survey 
respondents’ membership in politically relevant ethnic groups. 
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Puzzling Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision 
Applying multilevel models on cross-national survey data, this paper demonstrates that the relationship 
between ethnic diversity and tax morale is conditional on social and political trust. In less trustful 
societies, members of ethnic minorities react to the greater ethnic heterogeneity of their country more 
strongly than members of ethnic majorities. Generalized interpersonal trust and trust in government 
undermine the negative association between ethnic diversity and tax morale among this particularly 
vulnerable group. Public trust in government also increases tax morale globally. 
In the 1990s, development economists pinpointed ethnic fragmentation as a cause of low 
schooling and inadequate investment in infrastructure in Africa, the most underdeveloped region of the 
world (Easterly and Levine 1997). For example, Miguel and Gugerty (2005) found that Kenyan 
communities with an average ethnic diversity raised 20 percent less contributions for their schools than 
ethnically homogenous communities. Five thousand miles away, households in mixed communities in 
Indonesia were less likely to contribute money and labor to local health centers, rice cooperatives, and 
neighborhood irrigation associations (Okten and Osili 2004). Using cross-national survey data, Lago-
Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) showed that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is also associated with a 
lower tax morale. It should not come as a surprise then that local government’s investment in public 
goods, from education to roads to trash pickup, is inversely related to racial diversity in U.S. cities 
(Alesina et al. 1999). For a larger sample of countries, Alesina et al. (2001) found a similar negative 
association between ethnic fractionalization and the government’s social spending. Due to all this 
empirical evidence, “the notion that social divisions undermine economic progress” has become “one 
of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy” (Banerjee et al. 2005, 639). Since it is rarely 
easy – or desirable – to change the ethnic makeup of a country, ethnic heterogeneity can, according to 
this view, lock in low levels of economic development for many generations. 
Despite an impressive number of studies observing a negative association between ethnic 
diversity and public goods, many interesting cases deviate from this pattern. To use a particularly 
illustrative example, Miguel (2004) compared two nearby and similar districts, separated only by the 
Kenyan-Tanzanian border. Kenyan communities at an average level of ethnic diversity raised 25 percent 
less funding for their schools than homogenous communities. Across the border, in Tanzania, 
heterogeneous communities were equally successful as their homogenous counterparts. More broadly, 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, 794) concluded in their comprehensive survey of the relevant literature: 
 
Rich democratic societies work well with diversity, in the case of the United States very well in 
terms of growth and productivity. Even within the developing world, similar levels of ethnic 
diversity are associated with very different degrees of conflict and interethnic cooperation. 
 
This observation leads us to the question under what conditions ethnic diversity reduces people’s 
willingness to contribute to public goods provision. An answer to this question can also suggest how we 
can prevent or offset this negative effect. Only few studies have endeavored in this direction. Comparing 
Kenya and Tanzania, Miguel (2004) argued that Tanzanian political leaders managed to bridge ethnic 
divisions in their country chiefly by promoting Swahili as the common language. Similarly, Glennerster 
et al. (2010) highlighted the role of a common lingua franca in Liberia, where, as they found, ethnic 
heterogeneity did not influence local public goods provision. This paper contributes to the literature by 
adding another moderator – trust. 
 
Role of Trust 
The paper highlights reciprocal cooperation as a moderator of the relationship between ethnic diversity 
and people’s willingness to provide public goods in general – and their willingness to pay taxes in 
particular. As early as 1906, social scientists hailed reciprocity as “the vital principle of the society” 
(Hobhouse 1906, 12). Almost a century of research later, a Science article reiterated this view: 
“Reciprocation is the basis of human cooperation” (Nowak and Sigmund 2000, 819). Reciprocal 
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cooperation has become one of the universal social norms, present in most if not all moral codes 
(Gouldner 1960). Experimental research indicates that most people are indeed conditional cooperators; 
they are willing to cooperate if they trust others to cooperate as well (Chaudhuri 2011). Cooperation 
with strangers in a laboratory is usually associated with higher generalized trust and expectations of fair 
behavior (Gächter et al. 2004). 
If a conditional cooperator faces the decision whether to contribute to a collective effort, she 
estimates the likelihood that her partners will reciprocate cooperation. While giving to a charity, for 
instance, individuals increase their contributions if the money is matched by their peers (Meier 2006). 
It should be easy to estimate other people’s average contributions in a small village, where most 
interactions occur face-to-face and repeatedly over many years. However, individual reputation is not 
very helpful if a collective endeavor requires a large number of strangers to coordinate their behavior. 
We face a collective action problem of this type every year on tax day. Holding everything else 
equal, a conditional cooperator should be more willing to pay taxes if she expects other citizens to do 
the same. She should reduce her contributions if she expects other citizens to cheat. Survey data provide 
empirical evidence of reciprocal cooperation in tax compliance. For example, Frey and Torgler (2007) 
observed a strong correlation between European survey respondents’ beliefs about how high the tax 
evasion in their country is and their own tax morale. Frey and Torgler assumed that beliefs about average 
tax evasion vary across countries. The paper extends their line of argument by letting beliefs about 
average tax evasion vary also across ethnic groups within the same country. 
It is a normal cognitive function to classify people into social categories based on visible 
characteristics, such as race or gender, and to view thusly formed groups as homogenous in terms of 
personality traits (Fiske 2000; Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010). For example, Blacks in American society 
are often seen as “lazy” and “criminal” (Devine and Elliot 1995). As many other behavioral 
characteristics have become subject to group stereotypes, there is no reason to believe that expectations 
of tax compliance are immune to this natural tendency. In fact, as a popular American image of a black 
“welfare queen” illustrates, beliefs about net social contributions can become powerful ethnic 
stereotypes. 
Social psychology has collected so much empirical evidence showing that most people trust 
ingroup members more than outgroup members that Brewer (1999) redefined “ingroup” as a bounded 
community of mutual yet depersonalized trust, extending to all members of the group, but not to 
outsiders. Limiting trust to a smaller group is an exercise in risk management. Experimental data from 
Uganda suggest that it is easier to find and punish someone who exploited one's trust if the person 
belongs to one's own ethnic group (Habyarimana et al. 2009). Bad reputation of an untrustworthy person 
can also spread through her social network. Since social ties are usually denser within than across ethnic 
groups, it should be easier to obtain information about the past of a coethnic (Fearon and Laitin 1996). 
If a conditional cooperator only trusts her own ethnic group, her willingness to pay taxes should 
decrease as the proportion of outsiders among her potential partners increases. If people do not extend 
trust beyond the borders of their own ethnic group, the logic of reciprocal cooperation should lead to the 
result described in much of the literature – a negative association between ethnic diversity and people’s 
willingness to contribute to public goods. 
Although people tend to trust ingroup members more than outsiders on average, there is some 
degree of variation. For example, Italian respondents of a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 1996 
trusted the Swiss, Swedes, and Americans more than their own countrymen. Even more often, people 
extend their trust to humanity in general. This generalized trust can be defined as horizontal trust among 
people and it encompasses strangers and unknown groups as well. Freitag and Bühlmann (2009, 1540) 
considered generalized trust to be an indicator of the “environment of general reciprocity” that “makes 
cooperation possible, and minimizes the risks involved in the act of trust.” Unlike “particularized trust” 
in a specific ethnic group or in one’s immediate social circle, “generalized trust reflects a bond that 
people share across a society and across economic and ethnic groups, religions, and races” (Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005, 45). Particularized and generalized trust are distinct from each other both analytically 
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and empirically (Uslaner 2002). 
I expect generalized trust to break the negative association between ethnic diversity and tax 
morale. The argument makes several assumptions that, unfortunately, cannot be tested using available 
data. If the assumed relationships are weak, the estimates reported in the empirical section will be more 
noisy and potentially biased down. The first assumption is that people who trust their coethnics more 
than outsiders are also more likely to trust their coethnics to pay taxes. As a result, conditional 
cooperators should display higher individual-level tax morale as the share of the person’s ethnic group 
in the country’s population increases. Second, the paper assumes that generalized trust can be used as a 
proxy for trust in strangers’ tax compliance. In other words, trustful people should expect tax compliance 
to be similar across ethnic groups. Therefore, their expectations of overall tax compliance in the country 
should be independent from ethnic heterogeneity. If they are also conditional cooperators, trustful people 
should be equally willing to contribute to public goods regardless of how ethnically fragmented their 
society is. To sum up the observable implications, we should observe a significant interaction between 
ethnic heterogeneity and generalized trust. 
A different type of trust can still produce the same result even if the person in fact does not 
believe that all groups in her society are equally benevolent. Apart from horizontal generalized trust in 
fellow citizens, there also exists vertical trust between citizens and the state. Scholz and Lubell (1998) 
argued that vertical (political) trust creates focal points for cooperative solutions and horizontal (social) 
trust reduces the costs of enforcement of collective solutions. They also found that political trust, in the 
form of confidence in government institutions, is empirically associated with higher tax compliance. 
This finding was successfully replicated by Letki (2006), Marien and Hooghe (2010), and other studies. 
I argue that trust in political institutions should not only reduce tax evasion, but also reduce the negative 
effect of ethnic heterogeneity on tax morale. If a person believes that the state is effective and fair in 
punishing cheaters, she expects more cooperation from other rational citizens due to deterrence and 
subsequent conditional cooperation. The paper tests the hypothesized interactions between ethnic 
diversity and the two types of trust on worldwide survey data from 70 countries. 
 
Research Design 
The main goal of the paper is to model the individual tax morale as a function of ethnic diversity and 
trust. The unit of analysis is the individual respondent, and the data come from the World Values Survey. 
The World Values Survey (WVS) is a large-scale cross-national survey. This study pools the data from 
all the survey waves between 1990 and 2008. Table A.1 in the appendix lists the surveyed countries and 
years. Table A.2 describes the distribution of the variables used in the paper. 
Tax Evasion. The WVS does not ask directly whether the respondent evades taxes. A direct 
question would probably elicit a large number of socially desirable – yet untrue – responses. Due to the 
prevailing social norms, respondents would be unlikely to disclose free-riding behavior. Instead of a 
more direct question producing more biased answers, the WVS asks about people’s acceptance of tax 
evasion in general: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always 
be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Cheating on taxes if you have 
a chance.” Many researchers use this survey question as an inverse measure of tax morale, that is 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler 2006; Frey and Torgler 2007). As the risk of being 
caught is too low to deter rational tax cheaters, they argue that the observed high tax compliance levels 
are driven primarily by tax morale – we pay taxes because we believe it is the right thing to do (Frey 
and Torgler 2007). In fact, some people pay taxes even if the probability of detection of cheating is zero 
(Alm et al. 1992). 
Generalized Trust. Similarly to other large-scale surveys, the WVS measures generalized trust 
by the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people?” Answers are coded 1 (“Most people can be trusted”) or 0 (“Can’t 
be too careful”). Although Glaeser et al. (2000) found that the question was associated with greater 
trustworthiness – not trustfulness – among the subjects playing a laboratory trust game, Cox et al. (2009) 
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observed a positive correlation between trust measured by the survey question and trustful behavior in 
lab. Knack and Keefer (1997) found that the average generalized trust measured by the survey question 
was associated with return rates in wallet-drop experiments conducted in the same area. 
This standard proxy for generalized trust has been used extensively by survey researchers since 
the 1950s. Despite its popularity, it is plagued by a number of problems. First, it only roughly 
approximates the concept of generalized trust, as outlined in the previous section. A Hungarian 
respondent trusting other Hungarians would be able to agree that “most people can be trusted” without 
extending any trust to the Roma minority. Furthermore, different respondents may interpret the wording 
of the question in different ways. Does the question ask about most people they know, most strangers 
on the main street of their hometown, most inhabitants of their country, or most humans currently alive? 
Ambiguity is reinforced by the fact that the question does not refer to any specific trustworthy behavior. 
Trusting that one would get a correct change from a bartender versus trusting that a stranger would 
return a lost wallet with $1,000 in it are clearly different beliefs and we cannot know which one the 
respondent had in mind while answering the WVS question. Finally, as Miller and Mitamura (2003) 
pointed out, the WVS measure of generalized trust is double-barreled, conflating trust (“most people 
can be trusted”) with caution (“can’t be too careful”). Sadly, there is no other comprehensive cross-
national source of information about generalized trust. As I could not find a better proxy, I had to use 
the same imperfect survey measure as most previously published studies on trust. 
Trust in Government. The paper measures trust in government using the following survey 
question: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? The government.” The same question has been previously used by Letki 
(2006), Marien and Hooghe (2010), and other researchers. The correlation between political and social 
trust is typically weak because trust in government institutions varies to a great degree with partisanship: 
people who support the ideology of the ruling party are also more likely to express confidence in the 
government (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).  
Ethnic Fractionalization. Following other cross-national studies of ethnic diversity and public 
goods, I measure ethnic diversity at the country level. Of course, people are likely to consider ethnic 
diversity at different levels. If a person is deciding whether to pay for a ticket on a public bus, she might 
be more concerned with ethnic composition of the city or even with the ethnic identity of fellow bus 
passengers. However, most taxes are paid to the central government, which may redistribute the money 
throughout the whole country. Therefore, the country level seems to be appropriate for studying this 
behavior. Furthermore, country-level measures of ethnic fractionalization are already available and 
widely used in the political science and economics literature. Although there are several competing 
measures of ethnic heterogeneity, most of them are based on the Herfindahl concentration formula: 
 
𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑗  = 1 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
  
 
where 𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑗  is ethnolinguistic fractionalization of country 𝑗, 𝑠𝑖𝑗  is the share of group 𝑖 in country 𝑗, and 
𝑁 is the number of groups.1 This formula essentially measures the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals from the population will be from different groups. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) used the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), based on 
the data from Atlas Narodov Mira, a Soviet ethnographic atlas published in 1964. The Soviet source was 
                                                     
1 Notable exceptions include indices measuring ethnic polarization developed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and 
Cederman and Girardin (2007). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argued that polarization is a better predictor of ethnic 
conflict. However, this paper focuses on a different topic – tax morale. 
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originally popularized by Taylor et al. (1972). Since then, ELF has become a standard measure of ethnic 
heterogeneity in quantitative cross-national studies. Fearon (2003) built an alternative – and more up-
to-date – ethnic fractionalization score from a variety of different secondary sources. Finally, Alesina et 
al. (2003, 159) created an ethnic fractionalization index combining “racial and linguistic characteristics” 
in order to identify the most meaningful ethnic categories in each country. The primary source was 
Encyclopedia Britannica, complemented with the CIA World Factbook, national census data, and other 
sources. Due to an overlap of their sources, Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) produced very 
similar indices. Alesina’s index is probably the most widely-used measure of ethnic fractionalization in 
the fields of economics and political economy. Because of its comprehensive coverage of countries and 
wide use in the literature, I decided to adopt Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization index as a proxy for ethnic 
diversity. Just as virtually all ethnic fractionalization indices, the variable does not vary in time. Although 
Laitin and Posner (2001) criticized ethnic fractionalization indices as disregarding the fact that ethnic 
identities can change over time, the lack of temporal variation should not be a big problem for the short 
time window 1990-2008 explored in this study. 
Relative Group Size. Although ELF is a measure of choice in studies of ethnic diversity and 
public goods, it may not be the best measure. If a white tax-payer in the United States decides to 
minimize her tax burden because she believes that most minority members pay no income tax anyway, 
is she really concerned with the number and relative size of all ethnic groups living in the country – as 
studies using fractionalization indexes assume – or rather with the relative proportion of her own group 
of Whites? I argue that if a person is driven by higher trust of her own ethnic group, her tax morale 
should be based on the relative proportion of her own group in the total population. 
For each World Values Survey respondent, I tried to identify her membership in one of the 
politically relevant ethnic groups listed in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR), which is 
maintained by the ETH Zurich and the University of California Los Angeles. In few cases explained in 
the codebook (available at http://www.tusicisny.com/research-publications/), I also used Alesina et al. 
(2003) and Fearon (2003). Based on three survey questions on ethnicity, language, and religion, I was 
able to identify the relevant EPR group for more than 100,000 respondents. Then I assigned the relative 
size of the corresponding EPR group to all respondents belonging to this group. The relative size of 
ethnic groups in the resulting dataset ranges from 0.0003 (Jews in Poland) to 0.999 (Koreans in South 
Korea). People whose group membership could not be unambiguously identified were excluded from 
the analysis. For example, due to the lack of useful information in the WVS data, I could not differentiate 
between English, Scottish, and Welsh people living in the United Kingdom, though I could identify 
British Asians and Afro-Caribbeans. Fortunately, this extreme case was quite exceptional. 
In order to control for potential confounders, the analysis includes a number of individual-level 
control variables from the WVS: 
Acceptance of Bribe. Trustful people may refrain from free riding not because they expect 
strangers to reciprocate cooperation, but because of some innate personal attribute, such as altruism or 
natural law abidance. In fact, Uslaner (1999) used my dependent variable as part of his indicator of 
“moral behavior”; Guiso et al. (2003) as a proxy for people’s attitudes to legal norms; and Letki (2006) 
as an indicator of “civic morality”. To control for this confounding effect, I included another variable on 
the right side of the regression equation: acceptance of bribe.2 Controlling for this variable should isolate 
the public goods element of the dependent variable from general law compliance measured by the bribe 
question. 
Church Attendance. Listhaug and Miller (1985) and Guiso et al. (2003) found religious people 
to be less likely to approve of cheating on taxes. Based on a comprehensive review of more recent 
studies, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) consider this result to be one of the most robust findings in 
                                                     
2 The exact wording of the WVS question is: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code one answer 
for each statement). Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” 
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the tax compliance literature. At the same time, religion also influences generalized trust (Guiso et al. 
2006), creating a possible confounding problem. When Torgler (2006) concluded that religiosity raises 
tax morale, he analyzed a variety of related WVS questions. Among them, I chose church attendance 
because it appears very frequently in WVS national questionnaires. The question asked: “Apart from 
weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” 
I also added some individual-level demographic variables that influence the dependent variable 
and may correlate with trust: Sex, Age, Marital Status, Education, and Income.3 A great number of 
studies have found that tax compliance tends to be higher among older people, women, and married 
people (Uslaner 1999; Guiso et al. 2003; Torgler 2006). Age, gender, and marital status seem to be the 
most consistent demographic predictors of tax morale in the literature (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
2010). Listhaug and Miller (1985) and Guiso et al. (2003) also found people with a higher income to be 
more likely to cheat on taxes. The effect of education is much less consistent (Uslaner 1999; Torgler 
2006; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010). 
The following macro-level control variables are measured for each country-year in which the 
survey data were collected: 
Tax Revenue. As Rose (1984, 122) put it succinctly: “Within any given country, the level of 
tax resistance is likely to be greater when taxes are high rather than low.” At the same time, tax rates 
seem to correlate with generalized trust due to relatively heavy taxation in the exceptionally trustful 
Nordic countries. Moreover, the way ethnic politics influences people’s tax compliance may be different 
in the countries that actually rely on taxation than in the countries extracting rent from natural resources. 
The control variables thus include the overall tax revenue as a share of the country’s GDP (in percent). 
Given the high measurement error and the fact that the World Bank does not report this variable for all 
years, I computed country averages for each survey wave. So, for example, the missing tax revenue of 
Georgia in 1996 was imputed with Georgia’s average tax revenue during the whole survey wave (1994-
1999). 
Democracy. Political regime may be another country-level confounder. La Porta et al. (1999) 
found that ethnic diversity is associated simultaneously with bad governance, low public goods 
provision, low tax compliance, and less political freedom. Rothstein and Stolle (2008, 453) showed that 
“countries with high levels of generalized trust also have the most effective and impartial institutions 
and the longest experiences with democracy.” Tabellini (2010) sought an explanation in history: regions 
of Europe with less legal constraints on the executive in the past tend to be characterized by lower 
generalized trust in the present. As my variables of interest (ethnic diversity, generalized trust, public 
goods) are all correlated with political institutions, I included the Polity IV score of the country at the 
time of the survey as a control variable. 
GDP per capita. Both political regime and tax revenue correlate with economic development. 
In fact, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) argued that rich societies cope with the negative effect of ethnic 
diversity on economic growth better than poor societies. I used a natural logarithm of the World Bank 
estimates of GDP per capita, PPP, in constant 2005 dollars. All the variables used in the multilevel 
models presented here were rescaled to a continuous scale running from 0 to 1. This transformation to 
the same scale facilitated convergence of the complex mixed models that involve a three-way cross-
level interaction along with random intercepts and random slopes. As the regression analysis includes 
both individual-level and group-level predictors, I used the following mixed model: 
 
 
                                                     
3 Sex is coded 1 for male and 0 for female respondents. Age is coded in the number of years. Marital status differentiates 
between married (1) and unmarried (0) people. The highest educational level attained has eight categories, as provided by 
the WVS. The scale of income uses ten categories specific for each country. Therefore, this variable measures within-
country, but not between-country variation. 
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𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽5𝑐ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽9𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼1𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗
+ 𝛼2𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼4 log 𝐺𝐷𝑃/𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗
+ 𝛽11𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 × 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾1𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 × 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾2𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 × 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛾3𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 × 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗
× 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇0𝑗 + 𝜇1𝑗𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗
+ 𝜇2𝑗𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
Tax evasion of an individual 𝑖 in the country-year 𝑗 is explained by the individual-level and country-
level variables described above. Coefficients 𝛽 and 𝛼 denote fixed effects of these variables. 
Coefficients 𝛾 represent cross-level interactions of two or more variables measured at different levels.4 
Effects of unmeasured country-level confounding variables are absorbed in the random intercepts (𝜇0𝑗), 
varying across 76 different surveys conducted by WVS national teams in different years and countries. 
Random slopes (𝜇1𝑗 and 𝜇2𝑗) of relative group size and trust are necessary to estimate cross-level 
interactions. 
I used the design weights provided by the national WVS teams to make the samples more 
representative of the population of each country. Since I was interested in variation across countries, I 
did not use weights proportional to the total population of the country in the pooled data. Weighting by 
population of the country would practically discard variation in ethnic fractionalization among small 
countries and the overall results would be driven by the few biggest countries, such as China and the 
United States. A replication of the analysis without weights did not change any of the substantive 
findings. 
A price for using a large trove of observational data such as the World Values Survey is the 
threat of endogeneity. In principle, a historical accident may have caused both a cultural norm of paying 
one’s taxes and a higher rate of assimilation into the dominant ethnic group in a subset of countries. Or, 
higher tax compliance in the past could lead to higher trust in the present through satisfaction with a 
better functioning government. Despite the author’s attempt to include relevant confounders in the 
                                                     
4 The number of individual surveys used for this analysis (76) is much higher than the number of countries (up to 30) for which 
Stegmueller (2013) warned about a risk of bias resulting from cross-level interactions. 
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regression model, the omitted variable bias cannot be fully ruled out. The reverse causality problem 
could be alleviated by an instrumental variable regression if only one could find an instrument for trust. 
Unfortunately, none of the instruments proposed in the literature (including literacy levels in the 19th 
century, constraints on the executives in the past, constitutional monarchy, post-Communism, the 
grammatical rule allowing pronoun-drop, average temperature in the coldest month, and geographic 
latitude) seems to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Like many other cross-national studies, this paper 
sacrifices unambiguous causal identification in order to maximize external validity. Hopefully, its 
argument will be soon tested by experimental and quasi-experimental studies at the micro-level. 
 
Results 
Quantitative analysis of the cross-national survey data presented in this paper identified complex 
interactions between ethnic fractionalization, relative group size, and trust. Table 1 compares fixed 
effects in two models, one focusing on generalized trust and one focusing on trust in government. The 
centerpiece of the models are cross-level interactions between ethnic fractionalization, relative group 
size, and trust. A statistically significant three-way interaction term in both models indicates that the 
relationship between these variables is quite complex. Due to the presence of interactions, coefficients 
and standard errors should be interpreted conditionally. For example, the main effect of ethnic 
fractionalization with a coefficient of 0.061 and a standard error of 0.056 would only describe an effect 
on distrustful members of infinitely small ethnic groups. For everyone else, main effects should be taken 
into account jointly with interaction effects. As complex interactions are easier to grasp in a graphic 
form, I will focus the discussion of the findings on Figure 1 and Figure 3, which are based on Model 1 
and Model 2 respectively. 
Figure 1 shows the predicted values of the respondent’s approval of tax evasion as a function of 
ethnic fractionalization, relative group size, and generalized trust, while holding all other fixed effects 
constant at their median values. Random effects are set to zero in order to produce population-level 
predictions. Let us start with the first graph, predicting attitudes towards tax evasion among people with 
no generalized trust. 
Distrustful people are more approving of tax evasion as ethnic heterogeneity of the country 
increases. This result mirrors earlier findings by Alesina et al. (2001), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
(2010), and other studies. The relationship is stronger as the relative size of the respondent’s ethnic 
group decreases and smaller minorities are willing to justify tax evasion more readily than larger groups. 
The interaction between ethnic heterogeneity and relative group size leads to an interesting result: the 
highest support of tax evasion is among the small ethnic groups in highly heterogeneous countries. This 
subpopulation may be largely responsible for the negative association between ethnic diversity and 
contributions to public goods detected in previous studies. 
The plane representing the predicted values of tax evasion is somewhat flatter among trustful 
people. Although ethnic diversity still matters, its effect on the crucial subpopulation of the small ethnic 
groups in ethnically fragmented countries is much less detrimental. Trustful members of small minorities 
in extremely heterogeneous countries are no more likely to cheat on taxes than trustful members of small 
minorities in more homogenous countries. Among trustful people, greater ethnic diversity seems to be 
associated with higher tax evasion in large ethnic groups in the most heterogeneous countries. In 
practice, this is not a problem because the area with the predicted higher evasion rate is actually an 
almost empty set – by definition, there are not many very large groups in very heterogeneous countries. 
This potentially problematic area corresponds to the upper right corner of Figure 2, which plots the 
number of respondents by relative size of their group and ethnic fractionalization of their country. 
Respondents belonging to small groups in ethnically fragmented countries are much more numerous 
(lower right corner of Figure 2). 
Political trust interacts with ethnic diversity and relative group size in a similar way as social 
trust does. Figure 3 replicates Figure 1 for Model 2, which replaces generalized trust in the interaction 
terms with trust in government. The graph on the left shows predicted values of tax evasion among the 
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respondents who, when asked how much confidence in the government they had, said they had “none 
at all”. Again, the highest approval rate of tax evasion is among the respondents belonging to the small 
ethnic groups in ethnically highly fragmented countries. This subgroup would also benefit the most from 
having more trust. The respondents with a “great deal of confidence” in their government are much less 
willing to justify tax evasion across the board (see the graph on the right). However, the difference is 
the strongest for two different subgroups: members of the smallest ethnic minorities in highly 
heterogeneous countries and members of the dominant ethnic groups in highly homogenous countries. 
Echoing a similar finding for generalized trust, a higher support for tax cheaters among people trusting 
the government is predicted for the mostly hypothetical group of large ethnic groups in very 
heterogeneous societies. 
The relationship between ethnic diversity and tax compliance is moderated by trust in political 
institutions and trust has a potential to improve tax compliance especially in the societies composed of 
many small groups – the very same societies predicted by the standard theory to be in the worst situation. 
How much does trust change attitudes towards tax compliance in these countries? For an average 
Nigerian for instance, the gains from trust depend on whether she is part of a large or small group. For 
a group of the size of the Yoruba or Hausa-Fulani (25%), trust does not change the predicted average 
tax evasion approval rate (0.06) at all. However, if one’s group is ten times smaller (the size of the Tiv), 
higher political trust almost halves the tax evasion approval rate, from 0.07 to 0.04. 
Although both types of trust moderate the relationship between ethnic diversity and tax evasion, 
they do not erase it completely. On the one hand, both political and social trust weaken the connection 
between ethnic diversity and tax evasion among small ethnic groups. On the other hand, large ethnic 
groups seem to remain negatively affected by ethnic diversity even if they trust strangers and 
governments. Trust in government is a stronger predictor of tax morale than generalized trust, though 
this result may be partially attributed to a bad measure of the latter in the World Values Survey data. 
The regression analysis presented in Table 1 mostly confirms the findings of previous studies 
regarding individual-level factors. Tax compliance is higher among older, married, and religious people. 
Women tend to approve of cheating less often than men. Education is another negative predictor of tax 
evasion. Richer people tend to be more open to tax cheating. Country-level fixed effects of tax revenue, 
democracy, and GDP per capita failed to reach the threshold of statistical significance, though tax morale 
appears to be slightly lower in the countries with a more democratic regime and those extracting higher 
taxes from their populations. 
 
Conclusion 
The negative effect of ethnic diversity on public goods provision has become an accepted wisdom in the 
economics literature. However, not all ethnically mixed societies fare badly. Consequently, the question 
of which communities can escape the supposed poverty trap of ethnic fragmentation has become of 
crucial importance. Applying a new approach to an old problem, the paper offers a solution. 
Justification of tax evasion is more prevalent among distrustful ethnic minorities and, in this 
segment, it increases as ethnic fractionalization gets higher. Both generalized trust and trust in political 
institutions increase tax morale among the small ethnic groups in ethnically fragmented countries. 
Greater political trust is associated with an additional increase of tax morale among other groups as well. 
As trust has the most beneficial effect on those with the lowest tax morale – the small ethnic groups in 
ethnically highly diverse countries – increasing both vertical and horizontal trust can provide ethnically 
diverse countries with an escape route from their supposed poverty trap. 
The paper adds a new item to the short list of variables that moderate the relationship between 
ethnic diversity and public goods provision. Whereas other known moderators – common language 
(Miguel 2004), democratic regime (Collier 2000), and economic development (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2005) – are macro-scale and difficult to manipulate, trust can be increased more easily at the individual 
level. This unique feature has profound implications for future experimental research as well as 
policymaking. For example, governments may communicate more effectively the fact that a vast 
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majority of tax payers actually pay their taxes. If a better dissemination of information improves people’s 
beliefs about tax compliance in other ethnic groups, governments of multiethnic countries can increase 
their tax revenue simply by relying on the human natural tendency to reciprocate cooperation. A fair and 
effective justice system can increase people’s morale through two different channels: by increasing their 
trust in political institutions and by increasing trust in their fellow citizens regardless of ethnic 
differences.  
The paper’s main methodological contribution consists of adding information about the relative 
size of politically relevant ethnic groups to the largest source of cross-national survey data – the World 
Values Survey. Analytically, relative group size fits better the standard theoretical explanations of why 
ethnic diversity should correlate with lower contributions to public goods. Empirically, relative group 
size turned out to be a strong predictor of tax morale in the WVS data. The new dataset, available at 
http://www.tusicisny.com/research-publications/, can be used by other researchers whenever they 
believe that attitudes measured in the WVS may differ depending on whether the respondent belongs to 
an ethnic minority or a majority. 
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Table 1: Multilevel Model Predicting Approval of Tax Evasion 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Intercept 0.060 0.045  0.102* 0.049 
Individual-Level Variables     
Relative Group Size  0.005 0.023  0.018 0.027 
Generalized Trust  0.017 0.016  0.002 0.002 
Trust in Government -0.039*** 0.003 -0.057* 0.029 
Acceptance of Bribe  0.567*** 0.004  0.566*** 0.004 
Church Attendance -0.027*** 0.002 -0.027*** 0.002 
Male   0.016*** 0.001  0.016*** 0.001 
Age  -0.071*** 0.004 -0.069*** 0.004 
Education -0.015*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 
Income   0.034*** 0.003  0.034*** 0.003 
Married  -0.009*** 0.002 -0.009*** 0.002 
Country-Level Variables     
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.061 0.056  0.033 0.065 
Tax Revenue  0.093. 0.071  0.063 0.071 
Polity Score  0.037 0.026  0.039 0.026 
Log GDP per capita   0.003 0.034 -0.027 0.035 
Cross-Level Interactions, Generalized Trust 
Size * Trust -0.022 0.019   
Fractionalization * Trust -0.054. 0.030   
Fractionalization * Size -0.042 0.046   
Fractionalization * Size * Trust  0.099* 0.040   
Cross-Level Interactions, Trust in Government 
Size * Trust   -0.041 0.033 
Fractionalization * Trust   -0.014 0.053 
Fractionalization * Size   -0.102. 0.055 
Fractionalization * Size * Trust    0.182** 0.067 
N Individuals  83423   83423  
N Surveys  76   76  
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Predicted Approval of Tax Cheating Among Mistrustful People (Left) and Trustful People (Right) 
 
 
 Figure 2: Number of Respondents by Relative Group Size and Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Predicted Approval of Tax Cheating Among People Not Trusting Government (Left) and People Trusting Government 
(Right) 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Number of Respondents Classified into EPR Groups per Survey 
 Country 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 775 0 0 0 924 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1110 0 0 0 0 0 
Andorra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 980 0 0 0 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 1188 0 0 0 0 0 932 0 0 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 1800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Australia 0 0 1959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1320 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 1438 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 1357 0 0 0 0 0 1456 0 0 0 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 1514 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia and Herzeg. 0 0 0 0 0 1101 0 0 1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 1038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 867 0 0 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 829 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 840 0 0 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 867 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1754 0 0 0 0 1831 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 979 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 1030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2598 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 942 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1163 0 
Finland 0 0 0 907 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 984 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 524 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 1804 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1314 
Germany 0 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1781 0 0 
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1300 0 
Great Britain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 0 0 
 
 
 Country 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 989 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 432 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 250 0 4350 0 0 0 0 0 2014 0 0 0 998 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 329 0 0 0 1249 0 0 
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4289 0 0 0 0 0 7199 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 586 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1118 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 991 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 836 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 814 0 0 990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1055 0 0 
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1040 0 
Mexico 75 0 0 12 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0 846 0 0 0 0 0 868 0 0 1010 0 0 
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1933 0 0 0 0 1107 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 936 0 0 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 0 0 1111 0 0 0 0 1360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 972 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 979 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 1140 0 0 0 0 1564 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 859 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 1102 0 0 0 0 0 1522 0 0 0 
Russia 0 0 1749 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1685 0 0 
Serbia and Monten. 0 0 0 1238 0 0 0 0 1922 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 929 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 930 0 0 0 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1178 0 0 0 
 
 
 Country 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Spain 0 0 1039 0 0 0 0 1049 0 0 0 0 0 1061 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 904 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 901 0 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0 1017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 0 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2814 0 
Trinidad and Tob. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 834 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1182 0 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 798 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 2162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 658 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 923 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 817 0 0 
Venezuela 0 0 0 533 0 0 0 470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 925 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1082 0 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD N 
Tax Evasion 0.14 0.25 122614 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.44 0.23 122614 
Relative Group Size 0.60 0.29 122614 
Generalized Trust 0.27 0.45 122614 
Trust in Government 0.47 0.31 122614 
Acceptance of Bribe 0.08 0.20 121769 
Male 0.50 0.50 122484 
Age 0.31 0.19 122407 
Education 0.49 0.33 121710 
Income 0.40 0.26 110145 
Married 0.59 0.49 122373 
Church Attendance 0.51 0.36 118830 
Tax Revenue 0.30 0.13 99969 
Polity Score 0.68 0.35 118370 
Log GDP per Capita 0.51 0.25 118398 
Variables were rescaled to the scale from 0 to 1. 
 
 
